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SOLVING GAME BY SHAPLEY VALUE
METHOD
Hendra Saputra, T. P. Nababan, M. D. H. Gamal
Abstract. We study the Shapley value method in solving n-person game. It is de-
fined as a characteristic function which is the player’s coalition form. The optimal
strategy of every player is determined by the characteristic function. A numerical
example is given at the end of the discussion.
1. INTRODUCTION
Game theory is a theory of decision making among a competition. It is
not only occurring between two players but also occurring among several
players. For any game involving two players, if the game without saddle
point that uses the pure strategy cannot solve the game, then we use the
mixed strategy [1]. As the two-person game can be represented by a game
matrix, an m × n game matrix can be solved by linear programming as in
[2]. While in any game involving more than two players, it is defined a
characteristic function to solve the game.
Winston [2] says that the Shapley value is an alternative solution con-
cept for an n-person game with n ≥ 3 before the core. In this discussion we
deal more specifically with solving an n-player game by Shaley value and
give the algorithm. This article is a literature study referring to [1], [3] and
[2].
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This paper is organized as follows. Session 1 is an introduction of the
general description about the discussion. Session 2 defines the characteristic
function and shows the Shapley value of n-person game. Session 3 presents
a numerical example by solving a 4-player game. Finally, we conclude the
discussion of this paper in Session 4.
2. CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION AND SHAPLEY VALUE
In this discussion, we define the characteristic function for solving an
n-person game while any coalition among players is permited in the game.
Definition 1 [1, p. 213] For an n-person game, we shall let N = 1, 2, . . . , n
be the set of all players. Any nonempty subset of N (including N itself and
all the one-element subsets) is called a coalition.
Definition 2 [1, p. 213] By the characteristic function of an n-person game
we mean a real-valued function v defined on the subsets of N , which assigns
to each S ⊂ N the maximin value (to S) of the two-person game played
between S and N − S, assuming that these two coalitions form.
Definition 3 [1, p. 213] By an n-person game in characteristic function
form is meant a real-valued function v, defined on the subsets ofN , satisfying
conditions
1. v(∅) = 0.
2. If S ∩ T = ∅ and for any S, T ⊂ N , v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ).
Definition 1, 2 and 3 explain players’ coalition form in an n-game and
the definition of characteristic function.
Definition 4 [1, p. 261] A carrier for a game v is a coalition T such that,
for any S, v(S) = v(S ∩ T ).
Definition 5 [1, p. 261] Let v be an n-person game, and let pi be any
permutation of the set N . Then, by piv we mean the game u such that, for
any S = i1, i2, . . . , is,
u(pi(i1), pi(i2), . . . , pi(is)) = v(S).
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Effectively, the game u is a game v with the roles of the players interchanged
by the permutation pi. By Definition 4 and 5, Lloyd Shapley approached his
value axiomatically.
Axiom 6 (Shapley Axiom)[1, p. 262] By the value of a game v, we shall
mean an n-vector, ϕ[v], satisfying
A1. If S is any carrier of S, then
∑
S ϕi(v) = v(S).
A2. For any permutation pi and i ∈ N , ϕpi(i)[piv] = ϕi(v).
A3. If u and v are any games, ϕi[u+ v] = ϕi[u] + ϕi[v].
Lemma 7 [1, p. 262] For any coalition S, let the game wS be defined by
wS =
{
0 jika S * T ,
1 jika S ⊆ T .
If s is the number of players in S, then i-th player’s payoff in game wS is
ϕi[wS] =
{
1/s jika i ∈ S,
0 jika i /∈ S
(1)
Proof. It is clear that S subset of T , therefore S is a carrier for wS. By
Axiom 6 A2, it follows that
∑
T ϕi[wS] = 1 if S ⊆ T . This also means that
ϕi[wS] = 0 if i /∈ S.
Now, if pi is any permutation which carries S into itself, it is clear that
piwS = wS. Hence, by Axiom 6 A2, ϕi[wS] = ϕj[wS] for any i, j ∈ S. As
there are s of these terms, and their sum if 1, it follows that ϕi[wS] = 1/s if
i ∈ S. Hence (1) is proved
Lemma 8 [1, p. 263] If v is any game, then there exist 2n−1 real numbers
cS for S ⊆ N such that
v =
∑
S⊆N
cSwS, (2)
where wS is as in Lemma 7.
Proof. Let
cS =
∑
T⊆S
(−1)s−tv(T ), (3)
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where t is the number of elements in T . We shall show that these cS in (3)
satisfy (2) in Lemma 8. If U is any coalition,
∑
S⊆N
cSwS(U) =
∑
S⊆U
cS =
∑
S⊆U

∑
T⊆S
(−1)s−tv(T )


=
∑
T⊆U

∑
S⊆U
S⊇T
(−1)s−t

 v(T ). (4)
Now, consider the inner parenthesis in (4). For every value for s between
t and u, there will be
(
u−t
u−s
)
sets S with s elements such that T ⊆ S ⊆ U .
Hence the inner parenthesis may be replaced by
u∑
s=t
(
u − t
u− s
)
(−1)s−t. (5)
But this (5) is precisely the binomial expansion of (1− 1)u−t which will be
zero for all t < u and one if t = u. Hence we have
v(U) =
∑
S⊆N
cSwS(U)
for all U ⊆ N . 
Theorem 9 [1, p. 263] There is a unique function ϕ, defined on all games,
satisfying Axiom 6.
Proof. In fact, Lemma 8 shows that any game can be written as a linear
combination of games wS. By Lemma 7 the function ϕ is uniquely defined
for such games. Now, some of the coefficients cS are negative; however, it
is easy to see from Axiom 6 A3 that if u, v, and u− v are all games, then
ϕ[u − v] = ϕ[u] − ϕ[v]. By Axiom 6 A3, then the function ϕ is uniquely
defined for all games v. We can also give the exact form of the function ϕ.
We know from (2) that
v =
∑
S⊆N
cSwS
and so by (1)
ϕi[v] =
∑
S⊆N
cSϕi[wS] =
∑
S⊆N
i∈S
cS
1
s
.
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As cS is defined by (3), we obtain
ϕi[v] =
∑
S⊆N
i∈S
1
s

∑
T⊆S
(−1)s−tv(T )

 ,
and so
ϕi[v] =
∑
T⊆N

 ∑
S⊆N
T∪{i}⊆S
(−1)s−t
1
s
v(T )

 . (6)
From (6), let us write
γi =
∑
S⊆N
T∪{i}⊆S
(−1)s−t
1
s
. (7)
By (6), It is easy to see that if i /∈ T ′ and T = T ′ ∪ i, then γi(T
′) =
−γi(T ). In fact, all the terms in the right side of (7) will be the same in
both cases, except that t = t′+1 and so there is a change of sign throughout.
This means we will have (6) as
ϕi[v] =
∑
T⊆N
i∈T
γi(T )[v(T )− v(T − i)]. (8)
Now, we want to find the exact of γi in (7). If i ∈ T , we see there are exactly(
n−t
s−t
)
coalitions S with s elements such that T ⊆ S. Thus we have
γi(T ) =
n∑
s=t
(−1)s−t
(
n− t
s− t
)
1
s
. (9)
It is easy to see that 1/s can be replaced by
∫ 1
0 x
s−1dx. Hence, (9) will be
γi(T ) =
n∑
s=t
(−1)s−t
(
n− t
s− t
)∫ 1
0
xs−1dx
=
∫ 1
0
n∑
s=t
(−1)s−t
(
n− t
s− t
)
xs−1dx
=
∫ 1
0
xt−1
n∑
s=t
(−1)s−t
(
n− t
s− t
)
xs−tdx.
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It is clear that
∑n
s=t (−1)
s−t
(
n−t
s−t
)
xs−t is the binomial expantion of (1−x)n−t
and so
γi(T ) =
∫ 1
0
xt−1(1− x)n−tdx
γi(T ) =
(t− 1)!(n− t)!
n!
. (10)
Thus, by (8) and (10) we have
ϕi[v] =
∑
T⊆N
i⊆T
(t− 1)!(n− t)!
n!
[v(T )− v(T − i)]. (11)
Explicitly, (11) is the Shapley value, therefore Theorem 9 is proved. 
Now, we give the algorithm of how to decide an optimal strategy of
every player in any n-player games by Shapley value.
1. Define the characteristic function of all coalitions in the game. Then,
continue the work to the step 2.
2. Solve the game by the formulae (11), then it will show that every
player obtains the Shapley value which is his payoff of all his possible
coalition forms in the game.
3. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
Consider a council held by one of commissions in Indonesian People Repre-
sentatives or DPR RI, having respectively 30, 20, 20, 10, 10 and 10 percent
of vote shares. Any decision of the commission through voting can only be
settled by approval of any party’s decision who are winning more than 50
percent of vote shares.
It is clear that the game can be treated as a six-person game, hence we
have n = 6. In every player’s point of view through voting, any party will
try to participate in approving the council’s decision and by Definition 3,
it is clear that there are 27 characteristic functions of the game. The char-
acteristic function of Player 1’s coalition form wins are v({1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}),
v({1, 3, 4, 5, 6}), v({1, 2, 4, 5, 6}), v({1, 3, 5, 6}), v({1, 3, 4, 6}), v({1, 3, 4, 5}),
v({1, 2, 5, 6}), v({1, 2, 4, 6}), v({1, 2, 4, 5}), v({1, 3, 6}), v({1, 3, 5}), v({1, 3, 4}),
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v({1, 2, 6}), v({1, 2, 5}), v({1, 2, 4}) and v({1, 2, 3}).Hence the Shapley value
of Player 1 is
ϕ1 =
5!0!
6!
+ 2
4!1!
6!
+ 6
3!2!
6!
+ 7
2!3!
6!
=
27
60
.
Similarly, v({2, 3, 4, 5, 6}), v({2, 3, 5, 6}), v({2, 3, 4, 6}), v({2, 3, 4, 5}), v({1, 2, 5, 6}),
v({1, 2, 4, 6}), v({1, 2, 4, 5}), v({1, 2, 6}), v({1, 2, 5}), v({1, 2, 4}) and v({1, 2, 3})
are characteristic functions of Player 2’s coalition form which are not win-
ning if 2 is removed. Hence,
ϕ2 =
4!1!
6!
+ 6
3!2!
6!
+ 4
2!3!
6!
=
12
60
.
Because Player 3 has the same percentage of vote share with Player 2, it is
clear that Player 3 has similar characteristic function which are not winning
if 3 is removed. Hence, ϕ3 =
12
60 . The characteristic function of v({1, 4, 5, 6})
and v({2, 3, 4, 5, 6}) that belong to Player 4 are the same as to Player 5 and
Player 6, hence we find ϕ4 =
5
12 , ϕ5 =
5
12 and ϕ6 =
5
12 .
As every player plays the game individually and it is clear that the
strategy of coalition (1, 2, 3) is sufficient to win the game, the strategy
of coalition (1, 2, 3, 4), (1, 2, 3, 5), (1, 2, 3, 6), (1, 2, 3, 4, 5), (1, 2, 3, 4, 6) and
(1, 2, 3, 5, 6) do not belong to any player. Even though Player 4, Player 5
and Player 6 has the least percentage of vote share which is lower than
Player 2 and Player 3, note that the Shapley value gives them their role in
the game. On the other hand, Player 1 has the greatest percentage of vote
share, therefore whenever the party approves any council’s decisions through
voting, then the party has a greater opportunity to goal any decisions in the
council while Player 2 and Player 3 has less.
4. CONCLUSION
Shapley value is the player’s payoff in an n-person game where any
coalition is permitted and it corresponds to the characteristic function. The
first step to solve an n-person game by the Shapley value is to define all
characteristic functions in the game then, solve the game by the Shapley
value. If a player has many options of forming any coalitions, then Shapley
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value gives a better payoff than other players. The Shapley value also gives
every players to play their role which means it is a fair game.
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